In this paper, I investigate the phonological similarity of different elements of the phonological pole of multi-word units. I discuss two case studies on slightly different levels of abstractness. The first case study investigates lexically fully-specified V-NPDirObj idioms such as kick the bucket and lose one's cool; the idioms investigated are taken from the Collins Cobuild Dictionary of Idioms (Harper Collins, 2002). The second case study investigates the lexically less specified way-construction, which is exemplified by He fought his way through (...) the crowd (cf. Goldberg, Constructions: A Construction Grammar approach to argument structure, The University of Chicago Press, 1995: Ch. 9), on the basis of data from the British National Corpus 1.0. I show that both patterns exhibit a strong phonological within-pole relation, namely a strong preference for having their slots filled with phonologically similar elements, where phonological similarity is manifested in alliteration patterns. These preferences are statistically significant when compared to chance-level expectations derived both from the corpora and from the CELEX database (Baayen et al., The CELEX Lexical Database (CD-ROM), University of Pennsylvania, 1995) and are explained on the basis of Langacker's concept of syntactic and phonological constituents as well as current exemplar-/usage-based approaches. (shrink)

Cohesive powersof computable structures are effective analogs of ultrapowers, where cohesive sets play the role of ultrafilters. Let$\omega $,$\zeta $, and$\eta $denote the respective order-types of the natural numbers, the integers, and the rationals when thought of as linear orders. We investigate the cohesive powers of computable linear orders, with special emphasis on computable copies of$\omega $. If$\mathcal {L}$is a computable copy of$\omega $that is computably isomorphic to the usual presentation of$\omega $, then every cohesive power of$\mathcal {L}$has order-type$\omega + (...) \zeta \eta $. However, there are computable copies of$\omega $, necessarily not computably isomorphic to the usual presentation, having cohesive powers not elementarily equivalent to$\omega + \zeta \eta $. For example, we show that there is a computable copy of$\omega $with a cohesive power of order-type$\omega + \eta $. Our most general result is that if$X \subseteq \mathbb {N} \setminus \{0\}$is a Boolean combination of$\Sigma _2$sets, thought of as a set of finite order-types, then there is a computable copy of$\omega $with a cohesive power of order-type$\omega + \boldsymbol {\sigma }(X \cup \{\omega + \zeta \eta + \omega ^*\})$, where$\boldsymbol {\sigma }(X \cup \{\omega + \zeta \eta + \omega ^*\})$denotes the shuffle of the order-types inXand the order-type$\omega + \zeta \eta + \omega ^*$. Furthermore, ifXis finite and non-empty, then there is a computable copy of$\omega $with a cohesive power of order-type$\omega + \boldsymbol {\sigma }(X)$. (shrink)

There is a Turing computable embedding $\Phi $ of directed graphs $\mathcal {A}$ in undirected graphs. Moreover, there is a fixed tuple of formulas that give a uniform effective interpretation; i.e., for all directed graphs $\mathcal {A}$, these formulas interpret $\mathcal {A}$ in $\Phi $. It follows that $\mathcal {A}$ is Medvedev reducible to $\Phi $ uniformly; i.e., $\mathcal {A}\leq _s\Phi $ with a fixed Turing operator that serves for all $\mathcal {A}$. We observe that there is a graph G (...) that is not Medvedev reducible to any linear ordering. Hence, G is not effectively interpreted in any linear ordering. Similarly, there is a graph that is not interpreted in any linear ordering using computable $\Sigma _2$ formulas. Any graph can be interpreted in a linear ordering using computable $\Sigma _3$ formulas. Friedman and Stanley [4] gave a Turing computable embedding L of directed graphs in linear orderings. We show that there is no fixed tuple of $L_{\omega _1\omega }$ -formulas that, for all G, interpret the input graph G in the output linear ordering $L$. Harrison-Trainor and Montalbán [7] have also shown this, by a quite different proof. (shrink)

The article is devoted to identifying the specifics of Russian philosophy through the analysis of F. M. Dostoevsky and L.N. Shestov’s texts. The stylistic features of the two philosophers have been considered, their ways of philosophizing and denying of the cult of reason have been examined. The analysis is carried out using additional literature of French existentialism. To date, there are many researches in which study features of Russian philosophy. It is noted, that one of them are imagery, inseparable connection (...) between philosophy and faith and criticism of rationalism. The excessive cult of reason leads to such problems in the history as the creation of the hydrogen bomb, the environmental crisis and so on. The revolt against reason and the state of groundlessness are a response to the processes of modern rationalization and technocratization, an attempt to go beyond the limits of the usual paradigm, to get out of the closed subjectivity. Thus, it’s necessary to define the limits of the reason and develop a new way of philosophizing, for this reason it is proposed to consider the concept of groundlessness in the philosophy of L.N. Shestov, which makes the attempt to construct a philosophy, avoiding strict logic and excessive rationality. (shrink)

Music is a stimulus capable of triggering an array of basic and complex emotions. We investigated whether and how individuals employ music to induce specific emotional states in everyday situations for the purpose of emotion regulation. Furthermore, we wanted to examine whether specific emotion-regulation styles influence music selection in specific situations. Participants indicated how likely it would be that they would want to listen to various pieces of music (which are known to elicit specific emotions) in various emotional situations. Data (...) analyses by means of non-metric multidimensional scaling revealed a clear preference for pieces of music that were emotionally congruent with an emotional situation. In addition, we found that specific emotion-regulation styles might influence the selection of pieces of music characterised by specific emotions. Our findings demonstrate emotion-congruent music selection and highlight the important role of specific emotion-regulation styles in the selection of music in everyday situations. (shrink)

Corporate fetal protection policies are designed to protect unborn children from exposure to harmful substances in the workplace. In recent years, a number of corporations have instituted fetal protection policies which excluded all fertile female employees from jobs which exposed them to hazardous substances. Critics argued that these policies discriminated against women, and several lawsuits were filed.The United States Supreme Court recently decided a case involving the fetal protection policy of Johnson Controls, Inc. This article will analyze the impact of (...) the Supreme Court decision from a legal and ethical perspective. Practical guidelines for policies which protect the unborn and comply with the law will also be addressed. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of essays by various contributors in honor of the late Laurence Berns, Richard Hammond Elliot Tutor Emeritus at St. John's College, Annapolis. The essays address the literary, political, theological, and philosophical themes of his life's work as a scholar, teacher, and constant companion of the "great books.".

Equal Justice explores the role of the idea of equality in liberal theories of justice. The title indicates the book’s two-part thesis: first, I claim that justice is the central moral category in the socio-political domain; second, I argue for a specific conceptual and normative connection between the ideas of justice and equality. This pertains to the age-old question concerning the normative significance of equality in a theory of justice. The book develops an independent, systematic, and comprehensive theory of equality (...) and egalitarianism. The principal question is about the importance of equality in a theory of justice. More precisely, we should pose questions in four contracting circles: 1. Is justice the supreme value guiding our setup of the basic structure of society, or are there other, equally important values, such as recognition, care, communal belonging? 2. If justice is the highest guiding principle, which competing ideals—especially equality and freedom—ought to have precedence in a policy oriented toward justice? What status does the ideal of equality have in that framework? 3. If equality is a basic ideal of just policy, how should it be practically realized? What sort of equality (equal opportunity, equality of welfare, resource equality) should be demanded? 4. What patterned distribution of which specific goods does the ideal of equality demand? Which principles of distribution can be justified according to our justice ideal? To conclude and summarize: 5. What is the essential core of an egalitarian theory of justice, as opposed to an inegalitarian theory? These five questions structure the work’s order of argumentation. Part A elaborates the conceptual foundations and basic moral principles of justice and equality. Chapter I sets out to install justice as the central moral category in the socio-political domain. At the beginning of the first chapter, the conceptual foundations of justice are clarified. While not eliminating the classical distinctions between different forms of justice, I argue that the distributive paradigm is of primary importance. The primacy of justice in the socio-political domain is developed out of a confrontation with alternative positions, those which maintain either that justice generally, or distributive justice in particular, are subsidiary virtues. At the end of Chapter I, the first of the questions mentioned above is answered in a way that establishes justice as the guiding normative concept for the foundation and evaluation of any social order. To clarify the role of equality in a theory of justice, Chapter II separates the idea of equality into four different principles. They are organized in a way that begins with the most general and uncontroversial principle of equality, and progresses towards increasingly detailed and contested principles. There are two theses that articulate and defend the significance of equality for justice: First there is a conceptual connection between justice and equality, in that principles of formal and proportional equality are necessary in order to explicate the concept of justice. These two principles establish an unbreakable bond between justice and equality. Justice can only be explained—or so I argue—by reference to these and other (normative) principles of equality. The second thesis posits a normative relationship between justice and equality, which is disclosed by three substantive principles of equality: moral equality, the presumption of equality, and the principle of responsibility. I argue that the normative core of an egalitarian theory of justice is expressed by the latter two principles, which are themselves based on the first principle, that of moral equality. When we view one another as persons, what form of equality or equal treatment is normatively demanded? I argue that the answer to this question is given by the procedural principle of the presumption of equality: regardless of their apparent differences, all persons deserve strictly equal treatment, unless certain kinds of differences have whatever particular relevance would justify, on generally acceptable grounds, unequal treatment or unequal distribution. The justification of the presumption of equality is central to this work and has considerable importance. If the presumption principle’s validity can be justified by enlisting the principle of general justification, then the primacy of equality, and the essential argument for an egalitarian theory of justice, is established. This would likewise provide a procedure for the construction of a material theory of justice. The second question is answered thereby at the end of Chapter II: Equality should have primacy over competing ideals within a justice-oriented policy. The presumption of equality establishes this primacy and, at the same time, offers an appropriate metric and guideline for the construction of a material theory of distributive justice. The presumption of equality in Part B offers an elegant procedure for the development of a theory of distributive justice. Chapter III clearly sets out the necessary prerequisites that a theory of distribution must satisfy in order to determine a liberal-egalitarian distributional framework. We need to specify in which situation the distribution takes place; which goods are and are not to be distributed; in which respect the presumptive equality is to be produced; and by and to whom, and for what period, the relevant goods are to be distributed. The distribution is based on resources understood as general-purpose means. It is necessary to divide goods into different categories, since the justification for unequal treatment in one domain will not carry over into another. This makes presumptive equality necessarily complex. To that end, four spheres of justice are distinguished: (1) the political sphere, which involves allocating rights through the distribution of civil liberties; (2) the democratic sphere, in which political power and the rights of political participation are regulated; (3) the economic sphere, in which income and property are distributed; (4) the social sphere, in which social positions and opportunities are distributed. This framework of distributive justice answers the third of our guiding questions, about the nature of equality, in terms of equality of resources. Chapters IV and V set out the egalitarian distributive criteria for each sphere. I argue that the generally accepted, fundamental rights of classical liberalism are more effectively reconstructed by reference to the equal resource distribution presumptively required in those spheres. Chapter IV shows that when it comes to the first two spheres, those involving basic rights and freedoms and entitlement political participation, there can be no justified exceptions to the equal distribution of the relevant goods. That section argues, contrary to what we commonly find in theories of freedom or popular sovereignty, that the value of freedom and self-determination as the political basis of autonomy is best realized through the presumption of equal distribution. Chapter V deals with the other two spheres, those of economic goods and social positions, and argues for justified exceptions to equal distribution. In the economic sphere we find one principal reason favouring unequal distribution of resources, and three restrictions and compensations limiting that inequality. The basic exception to equal economic distribution arises from the unequal consequences of personal responsibility. From a suitably egalitarian standpoint, the principle of responsibility is the normative principle that determines which reasons justify economic inequality. Here the basic idea is that unequal shares of social goods are fair if they result from the choices and deliberate actions of the relevant parties. That individuals have to bear the costs of their own choices is a condition of autonomy. However, benefits or disadvantages arising from arbitrary and unmerited differences in social circumstances or natural endowments is unfair. The unequal consequences of independent decision-making and action must therefore be limited by compensating first for preferences, secondly for disadvantages, and thirdly by redistributing wealth in aid of the worse-off. I situations of emergency, compensating for disadvantages has priority over all other claims, owing to the urgency of the situation. Social inequalities go beyond the permissible limit if it is possible to improve the long-term social or economic situation of the worse-off by redistributing wealth to them. These exceptions lead to a complex system of free economic action within a framework of compensatory tax and transfer mechanisms. Finally, in the social sphere, the distribution of social positions, offices and opportunities must be structured to ensure that equally talented and motivated citizens have roughly equal chances of obtaining those offices or positions, irrespective of their economic or social class backgrounds. This compromise is permissible for reasons of freedom and prudence, and it makes a certain measure of inequality acceptable. The fourth of our guiding questions is answered accordingly. There are five principles of justice for the basic structure of society, and five legal principles that govern the special distribution of goods in the respective spheres—all are ranked according to their most defensible grounds of priority, ensuring that everyone is accorded equal justice. Chapter VI recapitulates the initial question of equality’s value. The conception of equal justice developed in this work postulates five principles of equality and five principles of law; these constitute an egalitarian framework because they support and promote social justice. Equality has value with respect to them, but is not given any independent, intrinsic value. That is why I call the account developed here a form of constitutive egalitarianism: justice is realized through the realization of equality, itself accomplished by applying the five postulates of equality and five distributive principles of law. This is an egalitarianism on two levels. The first level is involves the claim that morality or justice is conceptually connected with equality. The second level gives equality a substantial weight in what is conceptually validated at the first level, namely the presumption of equality, and constructs an appropriate interpretation and conception of distributive justice through principles of distribution for the individual spheres. The weight and importance of equality is shown by the distributive criteria applied to those spheres. This answers our final guiding question about the nature of an egalitarian theory. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to outline the historical context of Whitehead’s philosophical work with a special focus on the comparison to classical pragmatism. The paper is divided in two main parts. The first part deals with the characterization of process philosophy in general, especially with Whitehead’s version of this philosophical movement, and contrasts it to traditional (substantial and mechanistic) philosophies. The second part examines some important common features of Whitehead’s process philosophy and James’ and Dewey’s classical pragmatism. The (...) most important point of connection of their philosophical work is the concept of experience. It is also important to mention that for all of them the common epistemological basis is radical empiricism (or naturalistic empiricism in case of Dewey) and the ontological assumption of (some form of) realism. (shrink)

The subject of my dissertation is "rationality". In this book I undertake a comprehensive, systematic and independent treatment of the problem of rationality. This furthers progress toward a general theory of rationality, one that represents and defends a uniform conception of reason. The structure and general outline are as follows: Part I: General Definition of the Concept; Part II: Rationality in the Theoretical Realm; Part III: Rationality in the Practical Realm (parts II and III are divided respectively into A. Relative (...) Reasons and B. Absolute Reasons); Part IV: Grounds for the Principle of Reason. My aim in this work is to prove that a conception of rationality as justification of our usage of language is more significant than has been classically recognized, without, however, reducing the concept of rationality. After a definition of the term is provided in the first chapter by means of language analysis, the following three questions are dealt with in the subsequent chapters: a) Exhaustion of rationality in relative reasons—i.e., is reasoning exhausted by reference to existing views and goals, or does rationality also exist in a strong sense? The latter would be the case if the views and goals referred to the relative conception must themselves be justified de novo. I argue that such an absolute justification of views and goals cannot be provided. To this end, in the theoretical domain, I discuss a question prominent in the debate over the rationality of worldviews, namely the question of whether the standards of theoretical rationality are merely culturally relative (chapter V.). Here I arrive at the position that standards of theoretical rationality are only transcultural insofar as there are goals which are not themselves culturally-dependent. With regard to practically fundamental goals, the core standards of modern science can be justified. This justification strategy therefore requires that such goals be established. In practical terms, first I address (in Chapter VII) the so-called "final justification" of norms problem. Here I discuss above all the transcendental-pragmatic proposal and the contractualist conception. According to my view, neither succeed in providing a final rational grounding for norms. That grounding pertains instead to the rationale for objectives, and Chapter VIII demonstrates that even a final justification of objectives is impossible. This does not mean, however, that a person's goals cannot be criticized as irrational. But the warrant in this case depends on the rules that govern the genesis of desires being accepted by the subject. b) If substantive rationality does not exist because no absolute grounding for opinions and goals can obtain, then the question of how strong or weak the concept of rationality is acquires further weight. On that basis, relative theoretical and practical rationality is examined in detail. I aim with this analysis of (relative) rationality to apprehend the structural parallelism between rationality in both the practical and the theoretical domain, and therefore to defend a uniform conception of reason or rationality. This is accomplished by identifying a concept that exhibits the same structure in both theoretical and practical domains: the term "rational" is applied to actions and opinions in order to claim, first of all, that they are "well-founded." For example, one must inquire into the precise rational justification for opinions or actions. To determine the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions required for an opinion or action to be rational, one must first provide a formal characterization of the rationality of those opinions or actions. What is to count as a rational ground can only be explained by formal procedures and results achievable via those procedures. To be more specific, I claim that the process of opinion formation and practical reflection is subject to rational justification based on internalist rules. The rules governing theoretical rationality can have their content transformed in a further move, if one takes the result of the process of rational opinion-formation as the product of an epistemological determination, that is, as a decision about which opinion to hold that is made on the basis of epistemological or prudential goals. Implicit in this position is the controversial idea that one can actually decide to believe something. The rules of practical reason are the rules that guide the rational selection of objectives and actions. The structural parallelism of theoretical and practical rationality consists, therefore, in the fact that both refer to mental processes that are controlled by rules which one freely accepts and follows. In both cases, these rules are to be understood as governing the rational choice of a mental or physical action. c) Therefore, the question of whether rationality—being rational—can in turn be grounded by reasons can be answered in the following way: The rules of rationality can only be justified with reference to a person’s goals, as the best strategy for achieving those goals. If someone does not desire the optimal realization of his goals, there is no other way of arguing directly for rationality. One can only attempt to demonstrate—if the person is open to argument—that it is typically in the person's own best interest to adhere to the rules of rationality. (shrink)

Wenn Klassiker in der Philosophie die Funktion haben, Medien der Diskussion zu sein, so ist Cassirers Status als philosophischer Klassiker in besonderer Weise gerechtfertigt: Seine Philosophie ist strukturell auf kritische Vermittlung ausgelegt, und zwar sowohl im Sinn eines Theoriemediums, das eine Terminologie und Methode anbietet, wie auch als Mediator im Sinne der Integration unterschiedlicher, teils widerstrebender Positionen als Problemzusammenhänge. Um diese kritisch-kommunikative Bedeutung Cassirers deutlich und zugleich nutzbar zu machen, stellen die Beiträge des Bandes jeweils Aspekte seiner Philosophie in Beziehung (...) zu anderen philosophischen und wissenschaftlichen Projekten. Hierzu gehören analytische Metaphysik, Archäologie des Wissens, neuere psychiatrische und wahrnehmungsphilosophische Ansätze, kritische Theorie, philosophische Anthropologie, Pragmatismus, Leibphänomenologie, die Pittsburgh Schule u.v.m. Der Band versteht sich dabei nicht nur als ein Beitrag zur Cassirer-Forschung, sondern will allgemeiner für die kritisch-kommunikative Haltung eintreten, die sich an Cassirer lernen lässt, um sie in die Praxis der Philosophie insgesamt zu tragen. (shrink)

Topic of the paper is Q-logic - a logic of agency in its temporal and modal context. Q-logic may be considered as a basal logic of agency since the most important stitoperators discussed in the literature can be defined or axiomatized easily within its semantical and syntactical framework. Its basic agent dependent operator, the Q-operator (also known as Δ- or cstit-operator), which has been discussed independently by E v. Kutschera and B. E Chellas, is investigated here in respect of its (...) relation to other temporal and modal operators. The main result of the paper, then, is a completeness result for a calculus of Q-logic with respect to a semantics defined on the tree-approach to agency as introduced and developed by, among others, E v. Kutschera and N. D. Belnap. (shrink)

Na základe určitých špecifických prejavov lásky podáva Scheler v diele Wesen und Formen der Sympathie argumenty, podľa ktorých nie je možné zaradiť lásku k pocitom, ktoré vznikajú ako reakcia na nejaký vonkajší podnet. Láska podľa Schelera nepatrí medzi pocity, ktorých vlastným zmyslom je motivovať človeka k adekvátnej reakcii na prítomnosť nejakého prospešného alebo škodlivého objektu, a teda neprispieva primárne k prežitiu organizmu. Láska je naopak nezávislý a spontánny akt, v ktorom sa obohacuje duchovná zložka človeka - osoba. V tomto článku (...) analyzujem jeho najdôležitejšie argumenty a snažím sa ukázať, že aj napriek daným pozorovaniam nie je možné odmietnuť názor, podľa ktorého je láska pocitom. Nedostatočnosť jeho argumentov pritom nespočíva v nesprávnych pozorovaniach, ale v nesprávnom oddelení osoby od jej schopností, vlastností a hodnôt. (shrink)

Topic of the paper is Q-logic – a logic of agency in its temporal and modal context. Q-logic may be considered as a basal logic of agency since the most important stit-operators discussed in the literature can be defined or axiomatized easily within its semantical and syntactical framework. Its basic agent dependent operator, the Q-operator (also known as Δ- or cstit-operator), which has been discussed independently by F. v. Kutschera and B. F. Chellas, is investigated here in respect of its (...) relation to other temporal and modal operators. The main result of the paper, then, is a completeness result for a calculus of Q-logic with respect to a semantics defined on the tree-approach to agency as introduced and developed by, among others, F. v. Kutschera and N. D. Belnap. (shrink)

The “hypervigilance, escape, struggle, tonic immobility” evolutionarily hardwired acute peritraumatic response sequence is important for clinicians to understand. Our commentary supplements the useful article on human tonic immobility (TI) by Marx, Forsyth, Gallup, Fusé and Lexington (2008). A hallmark sign of TI is peritraumatic tachycardia, which others have documented as a major risk factor for subsequent posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). TI is evolutionarily highly conserved (uniform across species) and underscores the need for DSM-V planners to consider the inclusion of evolution (...) theory in the reconceptualization of anxiety and PTSD. We discuss the relevance of evolution theory to the DSM-V reconceptualization of acute dissociativeconversion symptoms and of epidemic sociogenic disorder(epidemic “hysteria”). Both are especially in need of attention in light of the increasing threat of terrorism against civilians. We provide other pertinent examples. Finally, evolution theory is not ideology driven (and makes testable predictions regarding etiology in “both directions”). For instance, it predicted the unexpected finding that some disorders conceptualized in DSM-IV-TR as innate phobias are conditioned responses and thus better conceptualized as mild forms of PTSD. Evolution theory may offer a conceptual framework in DSM-V both for treatment and for research on psychopathology. (shrink)

The DSM-III, DSM-IV, DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10 have judiciously minimized discussion of etiologies to distance clinical psychiatry from Freudian psychoanalysis. With this goal mostly achieved, discussion of etiological factors should be reintroduced into the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition. A research agenda for the DSM-V advocated the "development of a pathophysiologically based classification system". The author critically reviews the neuroevolutionary literature on stress-induced and fear circuitry disorders and related amygdala-driven, species-atypical fear behaviors of clinical severity in adult (...) humans. Over 30 empirically testable/falsifiable predictions are presented. It is noted that in DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10, the classification of stress and fear circuitry disorders is neither mode-of-acquisition-based nor brain-evolution-based. For example, snake phobia and dog phobia are clustered together. Similarly, research on blood-injection-injury-type-specific phobia clusters two fears different in their innateness: 1) an arguably ontogenetic memory-trace-overconsolidation-based fear and 2) a hardwired fear of the sight of one's blood or a sharp object penetrating one's skin. Genetic architecture-charting of fear-circuitry-related traits has been challenging. Various, non-phenotype-based architectures can serve as targets for research. In this article, the author will propose one such alternative genetic architecture. This article was inspired by the following: A) Nesse's "Smoke-Detector Principle", B) the increasing suspicion that the "smooth" rather than "lumpy" distribution of complex psychiatric phenotypes may in some cases be accounted for by oligogenic transmission, and C) insights from the initial sequence of the chimpanzee genome and comparison with the human genome by the Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium published in late 2005. Neuroevolutionary insights relevant to fear circuitry symptoms that primarily emerge overconsolidationally are presented. Also introduced is a human-evolution-based principle for clustering innate fear traits. The "Neuroevolutionary Time-depth Principle" of innate fears proposed in this article may be useful in the development of a neuroevolution-based taxonomic re-clustering of stress-triggered and fear-circuitry disorders in DSM-V. Four broad clusters of evolved fear circuits are proposed based on their time-depths: 1) Mesozoic circuits hardwired by wild-type alleles driven to fixation by Mesozoic selective sweeps; 2) Cenozoic circuits relevant to many specific phobias; 3) mid Paleolithic and upper Paleolithic circuits ; 4) Neolithic circuits. More importantly, the author presents evolutionary perspectives on warzone-related PTSD, Combat-Stress Reaction, Combat-related Stress, Operational-Stress, and other deployment-stress-induced symptoms. The Neuroevolutionary Time-depth Principle presented in this article may help explain the dissimilar stress-resilience levels following different types of acute threat to survival of oneself or one's progency. PTSD rates following exposure to lethal inter-group violence are usually 5-10 times higher than rates following large-scale natural disasters such as forest fires, floods, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, and earthquakes. The author predicts that both intentionally-caused large-scale bioevent-disasters, as well as natural bioevents such as SARS and avian flu pandemics will be an exception and are likely to be followed by PTSD rates approaching those that follow warzone exposure. During bioevents, Amygdala-driven and locus-coeruleus-driven epidemic pseudosomatic symptoms may be an order of magnitude more common than infection-caused cytokine-driven symptoms. Implications for the red cross and FEMA are discussed. It is also argued that hospital phobia as well as dog phobia, bird phobia and bat phobia require re-taxonomization in DSM-V in a new "overconsolidational disorders" category anchored around PTSD. The overconsolidational spectrum category may be conceptualized as straddling the fear circuitry spectrum disorders and the affective spectrum disorders categories, and may be a category for which Pitman's secondary prevention propranolol regimen may be specifically indicated as a "morning after pill" intervention. Predictions are presented regarding obsessive-compulsive disorder and "culture-bound" acute anxiety symptoms. Also discussed are insights relevant to pseudoneurological symptoms and to the forthcoming Dissociative-Conversive disorders category in DSM-V, including what the author terms fright-triggered acute pseudo-localized symptoms. Speculations based on studies of the human abnormal-spindle-like, microcephaly-associated gene, the microcephaly primary autosomal recessive gene, and the forkhead box p2 gene are made and incorporated into what is termed "The pre-FOXP2 Hypothesis of Blood-Injection-Injury Phobia." Finally, the author argues for a non-reductionistic fusion of "distal neurobiology" with clinical "proximal neurobiology," utilizing neurological heuristics. It is noted that the value of re-clustering fear traits based on behavioral ethology, human-phylogenomics-derived endophenotypes and on ontogenomics can be confirmed or disconfirmed using epidemiological or twin studies and psychiatric genomics. (shrink)

In this thesis the connection between coherence and reliability is investigated. The question may be phrased as follows: does the fact that a set of testimonies is coherent imply that the witnesses who have reported these testimonies are reliable? The same question may also be expressed in terms of beliefs: does the fact that a set of beliefs is coherent imply that the beliefs were reliably produced? Traditionally, coherence theorists have thought that coherence is connected to truth, but in this (...) dissertation the thesis is that it is rather connected to reliability. The investigation proceeds within a probabilistic framework, the so-called witness scenario, where a number of partially reliable witnesses give independent reports. Hence it is primarily coherent sets of testimonies that are discussed, but coherence of beliefs is taken to function similarly, and thus the results acquired using the witness scenario are, it is argued, relevant for the traditional discussion which mostly concerns coherence of beliefs. Using this scenario a notion of reliability-conduciveness, similar to the much-discussed notion of truth-conducivenes, is formally defined. This definition says, roughly, that a measure of coherence C is reliability-conducive if and only if the more coherent a set of testimonies is, as measured by C, the higher is the probability that a witness who has given one of these testimonies is reliable. In Papers I and II it is tested whether a number of coherence measures proposed in the literature are reliability-conducive in various salient scenarios. It is shown that the only coherence measure that is reliability-conducive in all of those scenarios is the so-called Shogenji measure. This observation is then used to argue that the Shogenji measure is a fruitful explication of the notion of coherence. However, in Paper III it is shown that in the most general scenario neither the Shogenji measure nor any other measure of coherence is reliability-conducive. In Paper IV, the use of coherence reasoning in court is investigated. It is shown that we often use the notion of coherence in judicial reasoning, for example to find out whether certain witnesses are reliable or not. Using the results from Papers I and II, as well as additional formal results that strengthen the connection between coherence and reliability, it is argued that this line of reasoning is valid. Also, it is argued in the introductory chapter that these findings show that coherence is indeed closely connected to reliability, even though it is not generally reliability-conducive, and that this connection is much closer than that between coherence and truth. In Paper V, coherent sets of so-called higher order testimonies are examined, where a higher order testimony is defined as a testimony concerning some other witness’s reliability . Such sets have hitherto not been examined within formal coherence theory. It is shown that coherence must be defined in a non-standard way to account for all our intuitions regarding sets involving higher order testimonies. It is then argued that this shows that in order to correctly estimate the degree of coherence of a set of beliefs, the believer must have a firm grasp of her own reliability; a fact that in turn is taken to be problematic for the coherence theory of justification. (shrink)

This book presents a complex picture of the universe and man from historical and contemporary perspectives, including philosophical, theological, and scientific perspectives. It consists of several papers by authors from various fields, and it is divided into three main parts. The first part addresses some interesting questions from the history of philosophy and theology; the second part focuses on contemporary astrophysics and astrobiology and the question of extraterrestrial life; the third part considers the ethical and environmental dimensions of these questions. (...) --------------------------- Received: 19/02/2023. Reviewed: 17/03/2023. Accepted: 30/03/2022. (shrink)

The publication of Davidson 2001, anthologizing articles from the 1980s and 1990s, encourages reconsidering arguments contained in them. One such argument is Davidson's omniscient-interpreter argument ('€˜OIA'€™) in Davidson 1983. The OIA allegedly establishes that it is necessary that most beliefs are true. Thus the omniscient interpreter, revived in 2001 and now 20 years old, was born to answer the skeptic. In Part I of this paper, I consider charges that the OIA establishes only that it is possible that most beliefs (...) are true; if correct, then it is also possibly the case that most beliefs are false—the skeptic’s very position. Next, I consider two responses on Davidson'€™s behalf, showing that each fails. In Part II, I show that the OIA establishes neither that it is necessarily merely possibly but actually the case that most beliefs are true. I then conclude that this is enough to answer the skeptic. (shrink)

Recent anthologizing of Davidson’s articles from the 1980s and 1990s encourages us to reconsider arguments contained in them. One such argument is Davidson’s omniscient-interpreter argument (“OIA”) in “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge,” first published 20 years ago. The OIA allegedly establishes that it is necessary that most beliefs are true. Thus the omniscient interpreter, now 20 years old, was born to answer the skeptic. In §1 of this paper, I consider charges that the OIA establishes only that it (...) is possible that most beliefs are true; if correct, then it is also possibly the case that most beliefs are false—the skeptic’s very position. Next, I consider two responses on Davidson’s behalf, showing that each fails. In §2, I show that the OIA establishes neither that it is necessarily nor possibly but actually the case that most beliefs are true. I then conclude that this is enough to answer the skeptic. (shrink)

The Israel–Palestine conflict is one of the most tenacious and polarizing conflicts in the world and, according to some analysts, one that is seemingly impossible to solve given the current input v...

This is a work in Kantian conceptual geography. It explores issues in analytic epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics by appealing to theses drawn from Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.

A special section of papers on the evolution, current status, and future development of self psychology highlights _The Evolution of Self Psychology_, volume 7 of the Progress in Self Psychology series. A critical review of recent books by Basch, Goldberg, and Stolorow et al. is part of this endeavor. Theoretical contributions to Volume 7 examine self psychology in relation to object relations theory and reconsider the relationship of psychotherapy to psychoanalysis. Clinical contributions deal with an intersubjective perspective on countertransference, (...) the trauma of incest, and envy in the transference. (shrink)

_The Widening Scope of Self Psychology_ is a watershed in the self-psychological literature, being a contemporary reprise on several major clinical themes through which self psychology, from its inception, has articulated its challenge to traditional psychoanalytic thinking. The volume opens with original papers on interpretation by eminent theorists in the self-psychological tradition, followed by a series of case studies and clinically grounded commentaries bearing on issues of sex and gender as they enter into analysis. Two thoughtful reexaminations of the meaning (...) and treatment challenges of chronic rage are followed by clinical papers that focus, respectively, on mourning, alter ego transferences, resistance to change, and pathological identification. Applied analytic contributions and a review of Goldberg's _The_ _Prisonhouse of Psychoanalysis_ round out a collection that testifies not only to the widening scope of self psychology, but to its deepening insights as well. (shrink)

In international commodity transactions, intermediary certifiers of quantity and quality play a crucial role. Sometimes they err, and when they do, the aggrieved party can pursue remedies against the counterparty or against the intermediary, either in contract or tort. The remedy against the intermediary has depended, at least in part, on whether the plaintiff was in privity. Even absent privity, the aggrieved party could possibly recover in tort. So held Cardozo in the leading New York case Glanzer v. Shepard. Section (...) I of this paper reviews the Glanzer litigation, with special emphasis on how the court suppressed many of the significant facts. Section II then turns to restitution by the principals. Section III explores the courts’ general hostility to intermediaries’ attempts to limit their liability by contract, and Section IV considers the judiciary’s sporadic efforts to place extra-contractual limits on intermediaries’ liability. Section V examines the surveyors’ response. (shrink)

The third volume in the distinguished Progress in Self Psychology series brings together the most exciting issues in a rapidly expanding field. _Frontiers in Self Psychology_ is highlighted by sections dealing with self psychology and infancy and self psychology and the psychoses. Clinical contributions include several case studies along with a reconsideration of dream interpretation. Theoretical contributions span issues of gender identity, boundary formation, and the biological foundation of self psychology.

Volume 16 of Progress in Self Psychology, _How Responsive Should We Be_, illuminates the continuing tension between Kohut's emphasis on the patient's subjective experience and the post-Kohutian intersubjectivists' concern with the therapist's own subjectivity by focusing on issues of therapeutic posture and degree of therapist activity. Teicholz provides an integrative context for examining this tension by discussing affect as the common denominator underlying the analyst's empathy, subjectivity, and authenticity. Responses to the tension encompass the stance of intersubjective contextualism, advocacy of (...) "active responsiveness," and emphasis on the thorough-going bidirectionality of the analytic endeavor. Balancing these perspectives are a reprise on Kohut's concept of prolonged empathic immersion and a recasting of the issue of closeness and distance in the analytic relationship in terms of analysis of "the tie to the negative selfobject." Additional clinical contributions examine severe bulimia and suicidal rage as attempts at self-state regulation and address the self-reparative functions that inhere in the act of dreaming. Like previous volumes in the series, volume 16 demonstrates the applicability of self psychology to nonanalytic treatment modalities and clinical populations. Here, self psychology is brought to bear on psychotherapy with placed children, on work with adults with nonverbal learning disabilities, and on brief therapy. Rector's examination of twinship and religious experience, Hagman's elucidation of the creative process, and Siegel and Topel's experiment with supervision via the internet exemplify the ever-expanding explanatory range of self-psychological insights. (shrink)

Volume 17 of Progress in Self Psychology, _The Narcissistic Patient Revisited_, begins with the next installment of Strozier's "From the Kohut Archives": first publication of a fragment by Kohut on social class and self-formation and of four letters from his final decade. Taken together, Hazel Ipp's richly textured "Case of Gayle" and the commentaries that it elicits amount to a searching reexamination of narcissistic pathology and the therapeutic process. This illuminating reprise on the clinical phenomenology Kohut associated with "narcissistic personality (...) disorder" accounts for the volume title. The ability of modern self psychology to integrate central concepts from other theories gains expression in Teicholz's proposal for a two-tiered theory of intersubjectivity, in Brownlow's examination of the fear of intimacy, and in Garfield's model for the treatment of psychosis. The social relevance of self psychology comes to the fore in an examination of the experience of adopted children and an inquiry into the roots of mystical experience, both of which concern the ubiquity of the human longing for an idealized parent imago. Among contributions that bring self-psychological ideas to bear on the arts, Frank Lachmann's provocative "Words and Music," which links the history of music to the history of psychoanalytic thought in the quest for universal substrata of psychological experience, deserves special mention. Annette Lachmann's consideration of empathic failure among the characters in Shakespeare's _Othello_ and Silverstein's reflections on Schubert's self-states and selfobject needs in relation to the specific poems set to music in his Lieder round out a collection as richly broad based as the field of self psychology itself. (shrink)

A collection of thoughtul presentations on transference and countertransference highlights _The Realities of Transference_, Volume 6 in the Progress in Self Psychology series. The selfobject transferences receive special attention. Elsewhere in this volme, selfobject phenomena are examined in relation to the process of working through, the origins of ambition, the psychology of addiction, the psychodynamic consequences of AIDS, and creativity. An exploration of the selfobjects of the second half of life offers new insight into later development.

_New Therapeutic Visions_ begins with Lachmann and Beebe's developmental perspectives on representational and selfobject transferences, followed by commentaries. In Section II, the self-psychological approach is brought to bear on the clinical treatment of an adolescent girl, incest survivors, addictive personalities, patients exhibiting codependency, and a case of desomatization. Section III, on applied self psychology, contains chapters on the theory of creativity; subjectivism, relativism, and realism in psychoanalysis; and quantum physics and self psychology. The final section offers two critical review essays (...) on major contributions to the self psychology literature by Wolf, by Bacal and Newman, and by Lichtenberg. Stolorow's chronicle of his personal odyssey into self psychology and intersubjectivity theory rounds out volume 8 of the Progress in Self Psychology series. (shrink)